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It is surprisingly difficult to isolate causal effects of police on crime empirically 
due to the simultaneous determination of crime and police presence. Instruments are used 
to address the simultaneity concerns in the previous crime literature. The 2SLS results 
provide evidence indicating that additional police reduce crime. However, we might 
suspect whether the same instruments can generate consistent results with previous 
studies by using datasets of more recent years instead of thirty years ago and considering 
the change of policies, crime situation, and other factors. This paper use electoral cycles 
as instrumental variable and updated data of the 1985-2010 period trying to explore the 
correlation between police and crime using electoral cycles as instruments in different 
situation. Results show that there are positive elasticities of violent crimes with respect to 
police as well as negative elasticities for property crimes.  Overall, we cannot conclude 
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The inherent nature of crime leads to substantial economic loss and threat to 
society and individuals. Crime reduction and prevention is always a top priority of the 
legislative, executive and judicial branches. While in the crime literature, an important 
challenge is to identify the causal effect of police presence on crime. Based on Gary 
Becker‟s (1968) theory, which looks at criminals as rational individuals seeking to 
maximize their own well-being through illegal ways, immense amounts of research are 
done by economists in an attempt to explain how deterrence works within the criminal 
justice system. One of the predictions of Becker‟s theory is that crime rates will decrease 
when police presence increases. However, the greatest challenge is to find empirical 
evidence supporting this prediction. In the studies of the crime literature, Samuel 
Cameron (1988) reports that among the 22 papers attempting to identify a causal effect of 
police on crime, only 18 found either no effect or a positive effect of police presence on 
crime. 
The challenge in estimating the effect of police on crime is the endogeneity 
existed in the simultaneous determination of crime and police presence (Franklin Fisher 
and Daniel Nagin, 1978). Government in a city with high crime rates is likely to respond 
to crime problems by enlarging police force.  Therefore, a positive correlation between 
police and crime can emerge. To break this endogeneity, several approaches are used in 
order to isolate causal effects of police on crime.  
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To address this problem, Levitt (1997) creates a strategy using electoral cycles as 
instrumental variables which affect the size of the police force, but is uncorrelated with 
crime. He employs the timing of gubernatorial and mayoral elections as instruments for 
police presence in panel data of 59 large U.S. cities from 1970-1992. By applying two-
state least-squares (2SLS) techniques, Levitt uncovers a negative and significant effect of 
police on violent crimes and relatively weak impact on property crimes, while the point 
estimates generally are not statistically significant for individual crime categories. As 
times change, the crime situation in recent years is not similar to that of 1970s and „80s 
period. In the legislation aspect, legalized abortion may cause the drop in crime 
(Donohue and Levitt 2001). Also, the U.S. prison population grew by over half a million 
during the 1990s and continued to grow slowly. This increase in the size of the prison 
population could be another factor explaining the drop in crime. The overall crime trend 
is different from that of Levitt‟s finding. So the conclusion generated by using the 
obsolete database of 1970-1992 in Levitt‟s paper may not be convincing applied to 
today‟s crime situation. In this paper, I will adopt an updated data set from 1985-2010 
from the same 59 large U.S. cities are used in Levitt‟s paper to test whether his method is 
applicable for the circumstance after the 1990s and explore the applicability of the 





Marvell and Moody (1996) employ the Granger causality test and analyze UCR 
crime rates and yearly police data at the state and city levels over two decades. They find 
Granger-causation in both directions and the impact of police on most crime types is 
substantial and robust at the city level. Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) find a large local 
deterrent effect of observable police on crime using data on the location of car thefts prior 
and post a terrorist attack on the main Jewish center in the city of Buenos Aires, 
Argentina. All Jewish and Muslim institutions received police protection in July 1994. 
Therefore, a geographical distribution of police forces, which can be presumed 
exogenous in a crime regression, was generated by this terrorist attack. This event 
constitutes a natural experiment, which broke the simultaneous determination of crime 
rates and police presence. Blocks that receive police protection suffer 0.081 fewer car 
thefts per month compared to blocks that do not. Police protection induces a decrease in 
auto theft of approximately 75 percent. However, blocks one or two blocks away from 
where protection is provided do not experience fewer auto thefts compared to the rest of 
the neighborhoods. Their results suggest a posted police guard generates a negative local 
effect on auto theft while generating little or no effect outside a narrow area. 
Nevertheless, the limitation of this approach restricts precise estimation of the extent of 
crime displacement to other areas.  
Levitt (1997) developed an approach using instrumental variables to break the 
simultaneity between police and crime. He finds that police presence increases in 
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mayoral and gubernatorial election years but not in off-election years.  In order to 
identify the effect of police on crime, he documents a previously unrecognized electoral 
cycle in police force staffing and uses the timing of mayoral and gubernatorial elections 
as an instrument for police presence. Data of a panel of 59 large U.S. cities over the 
period 1970-1992 are collected. It demonstrates that there is a positive cross-city 
correlation between police and crime, the same as which is presented in previous studies.  
After applying first differences which identify the parameters using only within-city 
variation over time, a negative coefficient on police emerges.  Adopting the two-stage 
least-square (2SLS) method, Levitt finds a more negative and significant effect of police 
on crime. Point estimate for violent crime with respect to police is about -0.1, and for 
property crime it is approximately -0.3. By using instrumental variables, the individual 
point estimates for each of the seven crime categories are negative in almost all cases, 
even though they are extremely imprecise. It is surprising that the result demonstrates 
murder exhibiting the largest and only significant coefficient. In the meantime, relatively 
large negative influences of police on crime are observed for robbery, aggravated assault, 
and motor vehicle theft. The reliability of electoral cycles serving as the instrumental 
variables might be questioned.  
Klick and Tabarrok (2005) claim another research design to estimate the causal 
effect of police on crime using terror alert levels. The Office of Homeland Security began 
to use the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) in order to notify the public and 
other government agencies of the risk of terrorist attacks on March 11, 2002. They use 
police presence increases on the streets of Washington, D.C. during high-alert periods 
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which could be used to break the endogeneity to estimate the effect of police presence on 
crime. Their method is most closely related to the one adopted by Tella and Schargrodsky 
(2004). Both of them take advantage of presumed exogenous shocks to police force and 
the impact of these shocks across time and space. The difference between the two is that 
the attack in July 1994 Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) observed is one precipitating 
event, while what Klick and Tabarrok (2005) used is a repeated event with the terror alert 
level rose and fell four times in their sampling period. Instead of annual data, daily data 
focusing on a single city are collected in order to be less subject to endogeneity problems 
and reduce omitted-variable bias in the cross-sectional component. The results 
demonstrate that an increase in police presence of 50 percent leads to a statistically and 
economically significant decline of 15 percent in the level of crime.  The decrease in the 
street crimes of auto theft and theft from automobiles contributes to the largest decline in 
crime with an elasticity of police on crime of -0.86. This result is proved to not be an 
artifact of changing tourism patterns resulting from the changes in the terror alert level. 
Even though his research provides a plausible estimate of the causal effect of police on 
crime, further research is needed to determine whether this effect can be generated to 
other cities or is particular to the Washington, D.C., area.  
In previous studies, researchers have used financial variables as instruments for 
the police number or expenditure on police. Cornwell and Trumbull (1994) used per 
capita tax revenue in North Carolina as an instrumental variable for police numbers 
arguing that countries with greater preference for law enforcement would vote for higher 
taxes to fund a larger police force. In order to eliminate the problem of simultaneity 
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between police presence and crime, Lin (2009) explores the pattern of the financial 
relations existing between state and local government, demonstrating that variations in 
state tax rates can be a valid instrumental variable for a local police force. He argues that 
state government revenues generated by state sales tax rates can be channeled by state 
transfers to local governments, therefore increasing the number of local police. Lin 
(2009) presents that fund transfers from the state governments to the local governments 
account for around 33.5% of the total local government revenues, while property tax 
accounts for 29.3%. At the state level, sales tax account for 28% of total state revenues. 
Other tax categories such as individual income tax and corporate income tax account for 
a much smaller proportion of overall state revenues relatively. Hence transfers from state 
to local government will generate a sufficient variation with the sales tax rate being the 
most identifiable source. According to the typical local government budget pattern, two 
thirds of the general funds are discretionary and three quarters of the discretionary funds 
available to city council are assigned to police and fire services (Coleman, 1997). 
Therefore, change in local government revenue from the state will have a high impact on 
police budgets and number of police presence. The results under the 2SLS method 
demonstrate the existence of a negative and significant police presence effect on crime, 
with the elasticity being about -1.1 for violent crime, and -0.9 for property crime.  
According to Levitt‟s (1997) research, conclusion were made by analyzing 
relatively old data over the period 1970-1992 and using mayor and gubernatorial election 
timing as instruments for police. Due to the crime situation change and the imprecision of 
the point estimates, I will use the same instrument and method and update the data set of 
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a more recent period to test whether the electoral cycle can also be an instrument to 
























The data used in this paper are comprised of observations on a panel of 59 U.S. 
large cities covering the period from 1985-2010. Cities selected are limited to two 
criteria: the city population exceeds 250,000 at some point in the 1985-2010 period, and 
the mayor is directly elected. Annually data of seven crime categories on city level 
including murder, rape, assault and robbery (referred to as „violent crimes‟) and burglary, 
larceny and motor vehicle theft (referred to as „property crimes‟) are obtained from the 
Uniform Crime Report (UCR) issued by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). As 
the summary statistics in Table 1 shows, for every 100,000 residents, violent crime rates 
for the cities in the sample are more than twice as high for the nation as a whole, while 
for property crime rates it is almost twice. Numbers of sworn officers who carry a gun 
and have the power of arrest are also obtained from the UCR, with approximately 261 per 
100,000 people. Data on police (sworn officers), and population are also obtained from 
UCR issued by the FBI. 
Since the timing of elections may influence the crime by many channels other 
than the police presence, a number of demographic, government spending, and economic 
variables are collected to avoid some of these concerns. All of these data are available in 
the Statistical Abstract of the United States. To control for economic fluctuations, annual 
unemployment rates in the state level are collected. It would be more precise to estimate 
the effect by collecting all variable at the city level annually. However, some variables 










Population 778623 1084540 69136 199110 8400907 
Violent 1286 690 337 220 4353 
   Murder 17 13 5 1 95 
   Rape 64 31 19 10 199 
   Robbery 524 342 163 73 2304 
   Assault 693 386 199 66 2368 
Property 7068 2434 1691 1574 16739 
   Burglary 1647 751 544 219 4994 
   Larceny 4244 1518 957 0 10003 
   Motor vehicle theft 1176 668 417 126 5369 
Sworn officer 259 106 22 112 781 
State unemployment rate 6.0 1.8 1.6 2.3 13.4 
Percent ages (18-24) 11.6 1.8 0.5 7.7 19.4 
Percent black 25.4 19.4 1.9 0.7 82.7 
Percent female-headed 
households 16.3 4.7 0.8 7.3 31.6 
Public welfare spending 
per capita (1985 dollars) 486.8 199.4 151.2 136.8 1245.7 
Education spending per 
capita (1985 dollars) 714.7 170.4 122.0 411.2 1377.5 
Note: all variables are per 100,000 residents except population. Data used is a set of 59 U.S. large cities 
with directly elected mayors over 1985-2010. Data of crime, sworn officer, and population are from UCR 
issued by the FBI. All other data is obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the United States. Percentage 




population that is black, and percentage of the population living in female-headed 
households are linearly interpolated for noncensus years due to the limitation of decennial 
census. Data on government spending for public welfare and education are combined 
state and local outlays per capita (in 1985 dollars) in a given state and year on the 
particular category instead of city level. This is because less than 10% of total state and 
local expenditures on those categories originate at the city level even though annual city 
government outlays on these programs are available. While according to the cities that 

































Figure 1 generally shows the trend of police, violent crime, and property crime (in 
per capita terms) over the period of 1985-2010 for the cities in the sample. Values of 
1985 of each category are indexed as 100. All three categories start to rise from 1985. 
While on the overall trend, violent crime and property crime began to decline and tracked 
each other closely from the beginning of 1990s. Until 2010, violent crime decreased by 
30% and property decreased almost by half. The police number grows slowly through the 
years overall.  
I also include year dummies and nine region dummies corresponding to the 
census definitions in the model. In addition, four city size indicators which are consistent 
with populations below 250,000, between 250,000 and 500,000, between 500,000 and 




MODEL AND SPECIFICATIONS 
According to Levitt (1997), Americans ranked crime at or near the top of their list 
of urgent issues in opinion surveys. A city‟s economic performance is outside the control 
of the mayor‟s responsibility while police staffing is a desired area for political 
manipulation since most police departments are operated by a unit of the local 
government. Every politician was expected to have a crime-fighting agenda. Incumbents 
will try to increase police force in advance of elections considering the significance of 
crime as a critical political issue and stating their governance of crime. Unlike the city 
government, state government does not directly organize local police departments. While 
state governments provide substantial local aid and more limited amount of 
intergovernmental grants to city government and local law enforcement typically, there is 
still incentive for incumbent governors to increase police force in election years. Table 2 
shows the mean percentage change in the police number per capita with respect to the 
election and nonelection years. Empirically, sworn officers‟ number rises by 
approximately 1.08 percent in mayoral election years and 1.97 percent in gubernatorial 
election years, while staying relatively flat (even decrease) in nonelection years. This is 
only a very simple comparison of the average percentage change in the sworn officers‟ 







Sworn Officers Change in Election Cycle  
 (1) 
 Δln sworn officers 
per capita 
Mayoral election years 0.0108 
 (1.49) 
  





No election years -0.00712 
 (-1.59) 
N 1508 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***




The formal model is generated taking account of other factors that may affect the 
growth of police force.  
        Δln Pit = β1Mit + β2Git + ηXit + λi + γt + εit                                    （1） 
Pit is the number of sworn officer per capita for city i in year t; M is the indicator 
variable which is one in mayor election years and zero otherwise; G is the indicator 
variable which is one in gubernatorial election years and zero otherwise; X is a matrix of 
covariates including the percent of age 18-24, percent of black, percent of female-headed 
households, state unemployment rate, public welfare spending per capita, and education 
spending per capita; city size indicator, year and region dummies. All variables except 






Predict the Change of Police Force Using the Election Cycle  
 (1) (2) (3) 













 (0.00382) (0.00389) (0.00399) 
    







 (0.00596) (0.00625) (0.00632) 
    
ΔState unemployment rate  -0.176 -0.188 
  (0.331) (0.337) 
    
ΔPercent ages (18-24)  -0.188 -1.855 
  (1.929) (2.432) 
    
ΔPercent black  0.425 1.150 
  (0.756) (1.169) 
    
ΔPercent female-headed 
households 
 0.436 0.237 
  (1.814) (2.918) 
    
Δln Public welfare spending per 
capita 
 0.0265 0.0262 
  (0.0149) (0.0151) 
    
Δln education spending per capita  -0.0152 -0.0153 
  (0.0292) (0.0297) 
Year indicators? Yes Yes Yes  
City size indicators? No Yes Yes  
City-fixed effects? No No  Yes  
Region indicators? Yes  Yes  No  
    
N 1451 1371 1371 
R
2
 0.067 0.078 0.096 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
Note: Dependent variable in all columns is Δln sworn officers per capita. Year dummies included in all 
regressions.Three city-size indicators are included in column (2). City –fixed effects are included in column 
(3). 
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Table 3 exhibits the estimates for variations in the equation (1). Column (1) 
contains only year and region dummies, and then city-size indicators are added to column 
(2). To explore the trend of police presence in city level, region dummies are replaced 
with city fixed effects in column (3). The results demonstrate that sworn officers per 
capita grow more than one percent in mayoral election years, and even higher (1.55%, 
1.7%, 1.68% in three columns, respectively) in gubernatorial election years. All of the 
coefficients of election years are jointly significant and consistent with Levitt‟s results 
which indicate a greater than 1 percent increase in sworn officer per capita in mayoral 
election years and greater than 2 percent increase in gubernatorial election years. On the 
contrary, the other variables in the regression are statistically insignificant. 
When applying the electoral cycles as instruments, the impact of police presence 
on crime is estimated using two-stage least squares (2SLS) as the following: 
 
         Δln Cijt = β1jΔln Pijt + β2j Δln Pijt-1 + ηjXit + λi + γtj + εijt     ,               （2） 
 
where Cijt is the crime rate per capita in city i for crime category j in year t; P is 
the number of sworn officers as the endogenous variable; X is the same matrix of 
covariates, which is described above. Since crime may be reduced by police through 
deterrence which potentially prevent initial crime commission by increasing the 
probability of being caught, or through incapacitation which arrest repeat offenders to 
prevent committing future crimes, an arrest today may have an impact on the crime in the 
future. With such consideration, the deterrence impact will not be immediate. Also, the 
 16 
incapacitation effect will be revealed after the offenders are sent to prison if lags in police 
exist. Therefore, lags in the police force will be included in the regression. The 
elasticities for all crime with respect to sworn officers are the sum of the coefficients for 
the contemporaneous and once-lagged values. The reason to include controls for public 
welfare spending per capita and education spending per capita is to avoid the situation 
that those variables may be correlated to crime by changing the opportunities sets of 
potential criminals, and affected by electoral cycles (Levitt 1997). Otherwise, the 
electoral cycle might be an invalid instrument. Unemployment rates in the state level are 
also included to control for the economic fluctuations.  
In addition, as election timing variables are fairly weak instruments for isolating 
the causal effect of police on crime, we could develop variation in the size of electoral 
effects on police so that more efficient estimation can be generated by expanding the sets 













Table 4 presents the OLS estimates of the violent crime with respect to sworn 
officers. Instead of simply summing up the total number of crimes across categories, four 
violent crime categories (murder, rape, robbery, and assault) are stacked together and 
estimated jointly. This will provide more effective means of involving the information 
included in the time series of individual crime categories since some crimes are much 
more frequent than others but much less sever.  Column (1) shows the OLS estimates of 
equation (2) in log-levels. After summing up the contemporaneous and once-lagged 
values, a positive coefficient of 0.312 with 0.119 standard errors is obtained meaning that 
rising police presence will induce higher crime rates. Column (2) presents the OLS 
estimates of equation (2) in log-levels with all data first differenced. By doing so, all of 
the parameters are identified using only within-city variation over time. The result shows 
that the coefficient on sworn officers becomes smaller but still positive which is around 
0.218. Compared to column (1) results, which estimate using cross-city variation, it 
indicates that the unobserved heterogeneity across cities impose an upward bias on the 
coefficient. The other coefficients are generally statistically insignificant and carry an 







OLS Estimates of Violent Crime with Respect to Sworn Officer 
 (1) (2) 
 ln violent Δln violent 





 (0.119) (0.0770) 
   
Lag ln sworn officer -0.0688 -0.0345 
 (0.119) (0.0504) 
   
Sum of ln sworn officer 0.312 0.218 
 （0.037） （0.070） 
   
State unemployment rate 3.543
***
 0.622 
 (0.719) (0.579) 
   
Percent ages 18-24 -0.0470 4.663 
 (0.417) (3.793) 




 (0.101) (1.218) 
   
Percent female-headed household -0.846
**
 -0.00156 
 (0.312) (2.968) 
   
ln public welfare spending per capita  0.0473 -0.00407 
 (0.0302) (0.0190) 
   
ln education spending per capita -0.192
***
 0.0397 
 (0.0456) (0.0454) 
N 5411 5107 
R
2
 0.931 0.081 
Data differenced? No  Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
Note: dependent variable in column (1) is ln one of the four crime categories (murder, rape, robbery, and 
assault) in log-levels, rather than log-differences. In column (2), dependent variable and right-hand-
variables are all differenced. Estimates are obtained estimating all violent crime categories jointly, allowing 
for a city-fixed effect across crime rates and heteroskedasticity across crime categories. Crime specific year 
dummies, region dummies and city-size indicators are included in all regressions.  
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By applying the 2SLS method to the equation (2), column (1) in table 5 shows 
that the pooled estimates of the effect of police on violent crime is around 2.531, 
implying that violent crime per capita raises by 25.31 percent, which is associated with 
10 percent increase in police per capita. The 2SLS estimates for police is statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level substantially larger in magnitude than their OLS counterparts. 
The coefficients of other variables are insignificant, except state unemployment rate and 
public welfare spending per capita being statistically significant at the 0.05 level. It 
implies that 1 percent increase in the unemployment rate leads to 1.52 percent increase in 
violent crime per capita. Based on the regression that uses election cycles as instruments, 
public welfare spending per capita shows a negative coefficient and significance at the 
0.05 level. Column (2) expands the set of instruments by interacting two election 
variables with four city size indicators and column (3) uses two election variables 
interacted with nine census-region indicators as instruments. This exploits variation in the 
size of the electoral impacts on police since electoral cycles only account for a small 
proportion of the overall variation in police presence. After the interactions between 
election and city size indicators are replaced as instruments in column (2), the coefficient 
of police still remain positive but shrinks to approximately 0.886 and becomes 
insignificant. Column (3) employs the interaction between election timing and nine 
region dummies as instruments, leading to a slightly higher coefficient of approximately 
0.909. However, those results and coefficients of all other variables in column (2) and (3) 




2SLS Estimates of Violent Crime with Respect to Sworn Officer 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Δlnviolent Δlnviolent Δlnviolent 
ln sworn officer 1.135
**
 0.517 0.436 
 (0.437) (0.346) (0.260) 
    
Lag ln sworn officer 1.396
**
 0.369 0.473 
 (0.481) (0.322) (0.274) 
    
Sum of ln sworn officer 2.532 0.886 0.909 
 （0.784） （0.526） （0.449） 
    
State unemployment rate 1.520
*
 0.884 0.866 
 (0.702) (0.629) (0.599) 
    
Percent ages 18-24 4.326 4.575 4.485 
 (3.779) (3.724) (3.718) 
    
Percent black 0.674 0.884 0.865 
 (1.361) (1.233) (1.235) 
    
Percent female-headed household 0.306 0.0758 0.185 
 (3.461) (3.062) (3.073) 
    
ln public welfare spending per capita  -0.0672
*
 -0.0223 -0.0231 
 (0.0316) (0.0240) (0.0231) 
    
ln education spending per capita 0.0916 0.0546 0.0558 
 (0.0530) (0.0462) (0.0456) 
N 5107 5107 5107 
R
2
 . 0.063 0.056 





Note: Dependent variable is Δln crime rate per capita for one of the four crime categories (murder, rape, 
robbery, and assault). Right-hand-variables are all first differenced. Estimates are obtained estimating all 
violent crime categories jointly, allowing for a city-fixed effect across crime rates and heteroskedasticity 
across crime categories. Crime specific year dummies, region dummies and city-size indicators are 
included in all regressions. Column (1) instruments using mayoral and gubernatorial election-year 
indicators. Column (2) instruments using interactions between the city-size indicators and election years. 
Column (3) instruments using interactions between the region dummies and election years. Standard errors 
in parentheses.  
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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Other than the estimates of elasticity of violent crimes with respect to police, 
Table 6 and 7 provide the OLS and 2SLS estimates of equation (2) for property crime, 
respectively. The results present a different pattern of coefficients from the case for 
violent crime. OLS estimates in column (1) of Table 6 find a positive coefficient on 
police (an elasticity of 0.155) when using cross-city variation and slightly larger (an 
elasticity of 0.181) after data is differenced in column (2). Unexpectedly, by employing 
election timing as instruments, 2SLS yields a negative insignificant estimate for property 
crime (an elasticity of -0.420) in Table 7. As the number of instruments increase, 
coefficients in column (2) and (3) shrink to -0.079 and -0.017, respectively.  
The coefficient change from OLS estimates to 2SLS estimates for violent and 
property crimes are both substantial (go from 0.218 to 2.531 for violent crime and from 
0.181 to -0.420) suggesting that instrumenting does have a large impact on the parameter 
estimates for the crime. The elasticities of both violent and property crimes with respect 
to the state unemployment rate indicate a positive effect of the unemployment rate on the 
crimes. A one percentage point increase in the state unemployment rate induces to 
roughly one percent increase in violent crime and over 0.3 percent increase in property 
crime, even though these estimates are never statistically significant. Similarly, the 
percentage of population between age 18 and 24 has positive signs when estimated in 
log-levels and log differenced. A one percentage point increase of population of ages 18 
to 24 induce approximately 4.4 percent increase in violent crimes and approximately 3.6 
percent increase in property crimes. But all coefficients of these variables are never 
statistically significant.  
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Table 6 
OLS Estimates of Property Crime with Respect to Sworn Officer 
 (1) (1) 
 lnproperty dlnproperty 





 (0.112) (0.0723) 
   
Lag ln sworn officer -0.103 -0.0429 
 (0.112) (0.0374) 
   
Sum of ln sworn officer 0.155 0.182 
 （0.035） （0.054） 
   
State unemployment rate 2.482
***
 0.616 
 (0.704) (0.452) 
   
Percent ages 18-24 2.133
***
 3.673 
 (0.427) (2.640) 




 (0.0935) (0.900) 
   
Percent female-headed household -0.594 0.484 
 (0.324) (2.303) 
   
ln public welfare spending per capita  -0.199
***
 -0.00581 
 (0.0328) (0.0160) 
   
ln education spending per capita -0.0905
*
 0.0165 
 (0.0413) (0.0327) 
N 4073 3845 
R
2
 0.756 0.121 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
Note: dependent variable in column (1) is ln one of the three crime categories (burglary, larceny, motor 
vehicle theft) in log-levels, rather than log-differences. In column (2), dependent variable and right-hand-
variables are all differenced. Estimates are obtained estimating all property crime categories jointly, 
allowing for a city-fixed effect across crime rates and heteroskedasticity across crime categories. Crime 







2SLS Estimates of Property Crime with Respect to Sworn Officer 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Δlnproperty Δlnproperty Δlnproperty 
ln sworn officer -0.164 0.117 0.0493 
 (0.334) (0.328) (0.195) 
    
Lag ln sworn officer -0.256 -0.196 -0.0324 
 (0.351) (0.261) (0.208) 
    
Sum of ln sworn officer -0.420 -0.079 0.0169 
 （0.601） （0.479） （0.332） 
    
State unemployment rate 0.329 0.511 0.516 
 (0.522) (0.508) (0.467) 
    
Percent ages 18-24 3.612 3.703 3.591 
 (2.684) (2.655) (2.641) 
    
Percent black 0.690 0.679 0.649 
 (0.910) (0.898) (0.897) 
    
Percent female-headed household 0.572 0.450 0.589 
 (2.375) (2.335) (2.338) 
    
ln public welfare spending per capita  0.0102 0.00134 -0.00162 
 (0.0228) (0.0205) (0.0182) 
    
ln education spending per capita 0.00412 0.0108 0.0135 
 (0.0354) (0.0344) (0.0328) 
N 3845 3845 3845 
R
2
 0.088 0.115 0.114 







Note: Dependent variable is Δln crime rate per capita for one of the three crime categories (burglary, 
larceny, motor vehicle theft). Right-hand-variables are all first differenced. Estimates are obtained 
estimating all property crime categories jointly, allowing for a city-fixed effect across crime rates and 
heteroskedasticity across crime categories. Crime specific year dummies, region dummies and city-size 
indicators are included in all regressions. Column (1) instruments using mayoral and gubernatorial election-
year indicators. Column (2) instruments using interactions between the city-size indicators and election 
years. Column (3) instruments using interactions between the region dummies and election years. S.D. in 
parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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Table 8 presents the estimates of seven specific crime categories eliminating all 
cross-crime restrictions. The seven columns correspond to the seven crime categories and 
each row presents a different specification. Only the sum of the contemporaneous 
coefficients and once-lagged values of sworn officers in each case are displayed. OLS in 
log levels yields positive coefficients on sworn officers in six of seven categories except 
rape. After first differences, only the murder presents negative coefficients leaving all 
others positive. Instrumenting for sworn officers leads to more positive to all violent 
crimes and more negative to all property crimes in spite of the extreme imprecision of the 
individual point estimates. Except for murder and larceny, expanding the set of 
instruments generally induces the coefficients to shrink.  Unlike Levitt‟s (1997) results, in 
which murder yields the greatest apparent negative effect of police, larger positive 




































murder 0.466 -0.104 1.405 -0.943 0.612 
 
(0.070) (0.232) (1.958) (1.530) (1.227) 
      Rape -0.308 0.414 2.918 1.407 0.507 
 
(0.066) (0.190) (1.592) (0.945) (0.830) 
      Robbery 0.758 0.140 2.972 1.204 1.097 
 
(0.066) (0.180) (1.246) (0.753) (0.623) 
      Assault 0.262 0.418 2.755 1.826 1.360 
 
(0.063) (0.196) (1.340) (0.903) (0.795) 
      Burglary 0.037 0.219 -0.015 0.709 -0.334 
 
(0.046) (0.147) (0.873) (0.665) (0.511) 
      Larceny 0.175 0.279 -0.092 0.024 0.669 
 
(0.044) (0.163) (0.829) (0.728) (0.469) 
      Motor 
vehicle theft 0.253 0.043 -1.149 -0.984 -0.298 
 
(0.063) (0.171) (1.258) (0.986) (0.676) 
 
Note: Dependent variable is Δln crime per capita for the named crime category, except in first row where 
log-levels, instead of log-differences, are used. Right-hand-variables also are differenced except in first row. 
The cross-crime restrictions on police elasticities are removed. Each row of the table presents crime-
specific coefficients on the police from a separate regression. All coefficients are the sum of 
contemporaneous and once-lagged coefficients. Estimates are obtained estimating all property crime 
categories jointly, allowing for a city-fixed effect across crime rates and heteroskedasticity across crime 
categories. Crime specific year dummies, region dummies and city-size indicators are included in all 




The results in the Appendix B shows that F test on the excluded instruments are 
all above 10 for violent crime estimates, while are less than 10 for property crime 
estimates. Based on this, we cannot conclude that electoral cycles are strong instruments 
for all crime categories. In order to explain the difference between my results and Levitt‟s 
(1997), the 2SLS estimates of crimes with respect to sworn officers are replicated using 
the overlapping research years between Levitt‟s (1997) data and mine. Results in the 
Appendix C displays the 2SLS estimates of the violent crime and property crime with 
respect to sworn officers for the research years overlapping with Levitt‟s (researched year 
1985-1992 in sample), respectively. The coefficient on sworn officer is   -0.550 for 
violent crime and -0.728 for property crime. After expanding the instrument sets, the 
coefficient become positive. The bias source might be the imprecision of 2SLS estimate, 
insufficient observation years or some other factors. However, for both pooled crime 
categories with election years as instruments, police do have a negative effect on crime. 
This indication is consistent with Levitt‟s (1997) research results and shows that the 
changing sign of the coefficient estimated using the whole period of 1985-2010 might be 










Based on Levitt‟s innovation of using electoral cycles as instruments for police, 
this paper use an updated dataset which covers the 1985-2010 period. The estimates in 
this paper preclude a strong conclusion that electoral cycles can be used in a later period 
to demonstrate the reducing crime effect of increasing police force. The elasticities of 
crime with respect to sworn officer are mostly positive instead of negative results 
generated by using the period of 1970-1992 in Levitt‟s paper.  Since election cycles 
explain only a small fraction of the overall variation in police, the instrumental variables‟ 
estimates are imprecise.  
Comparing the two different data periods, we can conclude that the basic trend for 
violent and property crime in the 1985-2010 period (Figure 1) is completely different 
from the previously twenty years. Between 1970 and 1992, violent crime has seen the 
greatest increase, more than doubling in these 59 cities. Until the mid 1980‟s, violent 
crime and property crime tracked each other fairly closely. Since that time, violent crime 
has steadily increased while property crime has flattened, but still increasing overall. 
While in the period I researched, trends in crime are quite different from 20 years earlier. 
Property crime displays a downward trend over the 26 years and violent crime tracked a 
similar path, even though it has a rising period before 1991. Another reason that might 
contribute to the unexpected positive relationship between police and crime will be the 
policy changes in the 1990s. According to Levitt (2001), legalized abortion may cause 
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the drop of crime, so the crime situation might be different from the period Levitt (1997) 
researched. 
Overall, this paper used electoral cycles as instruments while failing to provide 
evidence that additional police do reduce crime in different research periods and the 
instrumental variables‟ estimates are imprecise. However, we cannot say electoral cycles 
are not valid instrument for police officer to identify the relationship between police and 
crime. The unexpected positive correlation may be resulted from imperfection of model 
or data which are not all from city levels, as well as many other factors. Levitt‟s (1997) 
research uncovers the heretofore unnoticeable link between police presence and electoral 
cycles and provides a pioneering method to solve the endogeneity problem in 
simultaneous determination between police and crime.  Still, more future studies of 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































F Statistics on the Excluded Instruments 
First-Stage Regressions of Column (1) in Table 5 
 
Test of excluded instruments: 
F (58, 5048) =10.53 
Prob > F =0.0000 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0093573   .0067111    -1.39   0.163    -.0225139    .0037994
  lagecrime8    -.0134049   .0054723    -2.45   0.014    -.0241331   -.0026768
  lagecrime7    -.0134049   .0054723    -2.45   0.014    -.0241331   -.0026768
  lagecrime6    -.0134037    .005505    -2.43   0.015    -.0241959   -.0026115
  lagecrime5    -.0134049   .0054723    -2.45   0.014    -.0241331   -.0026768
  lagecrime4    -.0023787   .0045625    -0.52   0.602    -.0113232    .0065658
  lagecrime3    -.0023787   .0045625    -0.52   0.602    -.0113232    .0065658
  lagecrime2    -.0020887   .0046487    -0.45   0.653    -.0112022    .0070249
  lagecrime1    -.0023787   .0045625    -0.52   0.602    -.0113232    .0065658
     ecrime8     .0148827   .0062438     2.38   0.017     .0026422    .0271232
     ecrime7     .0148827   .0062438     2.38   0.017     .0026422    .0271232
     ecrime6     .0144988   .0062902     2.30   0.021     .0021673    .0268303
     ecrime5     .0148827   .0062438     2.38   0.017     .0026422    .0271232
     ecrime4     .0123576   .0039424     3.13   0.002     .0046288    .0200864
     ecrime3     .0123576   .0039424     3.13   0.002     .0046288    .0200864
     ecrime2      .012562   .0040003     3.14   0.002     .0047196    .0204044
     ecrime1     .0123576   .0039424     3.13   0.002     .0046288    .0200864
   citysize3     .0038494    .003198     1.20   0.229      -.00242    .0101188
   citysize2     .0029537   .0024583     1.20   0.230    -.0018656     .007773
   citysize1     .0157124   .0062156     2.53   0.012     .0035272    .0278977
     region9    -.0023107   .0036492    -0.63   0.527    -.0094647    .0048434
     region8    -.0024221    .003205    -0.76   0.450    -.0087053    .0038612
     region7    -.0011639   .0037557    -0.31   0.757    -.0085267    .0061989
     region6     .0089722   .0034478     2.60   0.009     .0022129    .0157314
     region5    -.0011451   .0030269    -0.38   0.705    -.0070791    .0047889
     region3    -.0067744   .0034043    -1.99   0.047    -.0134483   -.0001005
     region2    -.0023322   .0032899    -0.71   0.478    -.0087818    .0041175
     region1     -.004943   .0055441    -0.89   0.373     -.015812    .0059259
      year25       .01722   .0101499     1.70   0.090    -.0026782    .0371182
      year24     .0214681   .0068859     3.12   0.002     .0079688    .0349675
      year23     .0247551   .0086002     2.88   0.004     .0078951    .0416152
      year22    -.0096586   .0061765    -1.56   0.118    -.0217672    .0024501
      year21    -.0025201   .0047781    -0.53   0.598    -.0118873    .0068471
      year20    -.0017791   .0054125    -0.33   0.742    -.0123899    .0088317
      year19      .001012   .0063782     0.16   0.874     -.011492     .013516
      year18    -.0070287   .0071761    -0.98   0.327     -.021097    .0070397
      year17    -.0018018   .0056619    -0.32   0.750    -.0129015    .0092979
      year16     -.024421   .0058936    -4.14   0.000    -.0359751   -.0128669
      year15     .0205987   .0060139     3.43   0.001      .008809    .0323885
      year14     .0165354   .0073773     2.24   0.025     .0020728    .0309981
      year13       .00367   .0051198     0.72   0.474    -.0063671    .0137071
      year12     .0130531    .005283     2.47   0.014      .002696    .0234101
      year11     .0441541   .0103762     4.26   0.000     .0238122     .064496
      year10     .0014533   .0098695     0.15   0.883    -.0178952    .0208019
       year9     .0255737   .0055318     4.62   0.000      .014729    .0364184
       year8    -.0041086   .0059697    -0.69   0.491    -.0158119    .0075946
       year7    -.0007772   .0075911    -0.10   0.918    -.0156591    .0141048
       year6     .0202282    .006897     2.93   0.003     .0067071    .0337493
       year5     .0238031   .0064108     3.71   0.000     .0112352     .036371
       year3     .0076972   .0064629     1.19   0.234    -.0049729    .0203674
      crime3     4.30e-15   .0046144     0.00   1.000    -.0090462    .0090462
      crime2    -.0002518   .0046646    -0.05   0.957    -.0093965    .0088929
      crime1     5.14e-15   .0046144     0.00   1.000    -.0090462    .0090462
     dlneduc    -.0125812    .025058    -0.50   0.616    -.0617058    .0365435
   dlnpubwel     .0282374   .0072641     3.89   0.000     .0139967    .0424782
    dfemaleh     .4965967   .9833648     0.50   0.614    -1.431225    2.424418
      dblack    -.0094806   .3608311    -0.03   0.979    -.7168661     .697905
      dyoung    -.3031931   .9138517    -0.33   0.740    -2.094739    1.488353
       dunem    -.5557061   .2168887    -2.56   0.010    -.9809021   -.1305101
                                                                              
  dlnofficer        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
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Test of excluded instruments: 
F (58, 5048) = 10.04 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0138537   .0060793    -2.28   0.023    -.0257718   -.0019356
  lagecrime8      .022457   .0061935     3.63   0.000      .010315     .034599
  lagecrime7      .022457   .0061935     3.63   0.000      .010315     .034599
  lagecrime6      .022034   .0062236     3.54   0.000      .009833    .0342351
  lagecrime5      .022457   .0061935     3.63   0.000      .010315     .034599
  lagecrime4     .0104266   .0043516     2.40   0.017     .0018955    .0189578
  lagecrime3     .0104266   .0043516     2.40   0.017     .0018955    .0189578
  lagecrime2     .0103784   .0044393     2.34   0.019     .0016754    .0190813
  lagecrime1     .0104266   .0043516     2.40   0.017     .0018955    .0189578
     ecrime8     .0050629   .0048568     1.04   0.297    -.0044584    .0145843
     ecrime7     .0050629   .0048568     1.04   0.297    -.0044584    .0145843
     ecrime6     .0049597   .0049001     1.01   0.312    -.0046466    .0145661
     ecrime5     .0050629   .0048568     1.04   0.297    -.0044584    .0145843
     ecrime4     -.000034   .0041874    -0.01   0.994    -.0082432    .0081752
     ecrime3     -.000034   .0041874    -0.01   0.994    -.0082432    .0081752
     ecrime2    -.0002748   .0042447    -0.06   0.948    -.0085963    .0080466
     ecrime1     -.000034   .0041874    -0.01   0.994    -.0082432    .0081752
   citysize3    -.0012315   .0032766    -0.38   0.707    -.0076551     .005192
   citysize2     .0028657   .0026347     1.09   0.277    -.0022995    .0080308
   citysize1    -.0026236   .0040014    -0.66   0.512    -.0104681    .0052209
     region9     .0012757   .0037846     0.34   0.736    -.0061438    .0086952
     region8      .002347   .0034093     0.69   0.491    -.0043368    .0090308
     region7     .0040527   .0041527     0.98   0.329    -.0040885    .0121938
     region6     .0110336   .0035574     3.10   0.002     .0040595    .0180077
     region5     .0015828   .0030424     0.52   0.603    -.0043817    .0075474
     region3    -.0001245   .0037005    -0.03   0.973    -.0073792    .0071302
     region2     .0001496   .0032197     0.05   0.963    -.0061623    .0064616
     region1     .0081836   .0055454     1.48   0.140    -.0026878     .019055
      year25     .0324344   .0104284     3.11   0.002     .0119902    .0528787
      year24     .0215309   .0086576     2.49   0.013     .0045582    .0385036
      year23    -.0124599   .0063385    -1.97   0.049     -.024886   -.0000337
      year22    -.0011312   .0054342    -0.21   0.835    -.0117846    .0095222
      year21     -.000522   .0054341    -0.10   0.923    -.0111752    .0101311
      year20    -.0092455   .0052852    -1.75   0.080    -.0196069    .0011158
      year19     -.015439   .0063404    -2.44   0.015    -.0278689    -.003009
      year18     -.003654   .0065322    -0.56   0.576      -.01646    .0091519
      year17    -.0202164   .0063699    -3.17   0.002    -.0327041   -.0077287
      year16     .0164251   .0047145     3.48   0.000     .0071827    .0256675
      year15     .0115965   .0071712     1.62   0.106    -.0024621    .0256551
      year14     .0058834    .005514     1.07   0.286    -.0049265    .0166933
      year13     .0141998   .0051012     2.78   0.005     .0041993    .0242003
      year12     .0394287   .0096266     4.10   0.000     .0205564     .058301
      year11     .0018969   .0100611     0.19   0.850    -.0178273    .0216211
      year10     .0250692   .0062181     4.03   0.000      .012879    .0372594
       year9    -.0027579   .0046777    -0.59   0.555    -.0119282    .0064124
       year8    -.0128262   .0060048    -2.14   0.033    -.0245981   -.0010542
       year7     .0195587   .0077852     2.51   0.012     .0042962    .0348211
       year6     .0226862   .0066617     3.41   0.001     .0096262    .0357461
       year5     .0058704   .0059975     0.98   0.328    -.0058873    .0176281
       year3     .0030132    .006521     0.46   0.644    -.0097707    .0157972
      crime3    -4.11e-15   .0050195    -0.00   1.000    -.0098405    .0098405
      crime2     .0001465   .0050781     0.03   0.977    -.0098088    .0101017
      crime1    -4.99e-15   .0050195    -0.00   1.000    -.0098405    .0098405
     dlneduc    -.0287682   .0222989    -1.29   0.197    -.0724837    .0149473
   dlnpubwel     .0265776   .0076121     3.49   0.000     .0116546    .0415005
    dfemaleh    -.7455128    1.05905    -0.70   0.481     -2.82171    1.330684
      dblack     .1962774   .3627028     0.54   0.588    -.5147776    .9073324
      dyoung     .5351363   .8391147     0.64   0.524    -1.109893    2.180165
       dunem      -.35327   .2256789    -1.57   0.118    -.7956985    .0891586
                                                                              
lagdlnoffi~r        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
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First-Stage Regressions of Column(1) in Table 7 
 
Test of excluded instruments: 
F (58, 5048) =8.53 
Prob > F =0.0000 
                                                                              
       _cons     .0100839   .0096518     1.04   0.296    -.0088393    .0290072
  lagecrime7    -.0133163   .0058486    -2.28   0.023     -.024783   -.0018495
  lagecrime6    -.0133864   .0058434    -2.29   0.022    -.0248428     -.00193
  lagecrime5    -.0133163   .0058486    -2.28   0.023     -.024783   -.0018495
  lagecrime3    -.0022554    .004606    -0.49   0.624    -.0112859    .0067751
  lagecrime2     -.002547   .0046178    -0.55   0.581    -.0116006    .0065067
  lagecrime1    -.0022554    .004606    -0.49   0.624    -.0112859    .0067751
     ecrime7     .0147596   .0066834     2.21   0.027     .0016562    .0278631
     ecrime6     .0148499   .0066915     2.22   0.027     .0017306    .0279693
     ecrime5     .0147596   .0066834     2.21   0.027     .0016562    .0278631
     ecrime3     .0123066   .0039599     3.11   0.002      .004543    .0200703
     ecrime2     .0121449   .0039655     3.06   0.002     .0043702    .0199196
     ecrime1     .0123066   .0039599     3.11   0.002      .004543    .0200703
   citysize3     .0036212   .0036152     1.00   0.317    -.0034666    .0107091
   citysize2     .0026535   .0027716     0.96   0.338    -.0027804    .0080875
   citysize1     .0153529   .0071432     2.15   0.032     .0013481    .0293578
     region9     .0026088    .006851     0.38   0.703    -.0108232    .0160408
     region8     .0026417   .0059938     0.44   0.659    -.0091098    .0143931
     region7     .0038543   .0065939     0.58   0.559    -.0090737    .0167823
     region6     .0140177   .0060152     2.33   0.020     .0022243     .025811
     region5     .0038505   .0056653     0.68   0.497    -.0072568    .0149578
     region4     .0049765   .0064054     0.78   0.437    -.0075818    .0175348
     region3     -.001334   .0059257    -0.23   0.822    -.0129518    .0102838
     region2     .0026099   .0063632     0.41   0.682    -.0098657    .0150856
      year25    -.0059047   .0113313    -0.52   0.602    -.0281207    .0163114
      year24    -.0027533   .0080494    -0.34   0.732     -.018535    .0130283
      year23     .0005991   .0097423     0.06   0.951    -.0185016    .0196997
      year22    -.0335556   .0078901    -4.25   0.000    -.0490248   -.0180864
      year21    -.0266625   .0061722    -4.32   0.000    -.0387637   -.0145613
      year20    -.0260083   .0070017    -3.71   0.000    -.0397357   -.0122809
      year19    -.0229956   .0073939    -3.11   0.002     -.037492   -.0084992
      year18    -.0309246   .0085866    -3.60   0.000    -.0477593   -.0140899
      year17    -.0256967   .0065992    -3.89   0.000     -.038635   -.0127583
      year16    -.0483869   .0070738    -6.84   0.000    -.0622558    -.034518
      year15    -.0037292   .0068922    -0.54   0.588    -.0172419    .0097835
      year14    -.0076659   .0089528    -0.86   0.392    -.0252186    .0098868
      year13    -.0203115    .006372    -3.19   0.001    -.0328042   -.0078187
      year12    -.0111939   .0065454    -1.71   0.087    -.0240268     .001639
      year11     .0200162   .0119754     1.67   0.095    -.0034627    .0434952
      year10    -.0224962   .0114874    -1.96   0.050    -.0450182    .0000259
       year9     .0012244   .0068036     0.18   0.857    -.0121147    .0145634
       year8    -.0280395   .0069288    -4.05   0.000    -.0416241   -.0144548
       year7     -.024034   .0085083    -2.82   0.005    -.0407154   -.0073527
       year6    -.0042401    .008493    -0.50   0.618    -.0208915    .0124113
       year4    -.0247299   .0073637    -3.36   0.001     -.039167   -.0102927
       year3    -.0161217   .0077252    -2.09   0.037    -.0312677   -.0009757
      crime3    -.0001716   .0046271    -0.04   0.970    -.0092435    .0089002
      crime1    -.0001716   .0046271    -0.04   0.970    -.0092435    .0089002
     dlneduc     -.013408    .028961    -0.46   0.643    -.0701885    .0433726
   dlnpubwel     .0280618   .0083818     3.35   0.001     .0116286     .044495
    dfemaleh     .4721961   1.130266     0.42   0.676    -1.743792    2.688184
      dblack    -.0287412      .4172    -0.07   0.945    -.8466993    .7892169
      dyoung    -.2912522   1.055093    -0.28   0.783    -2.359857    1.777352
       dunem    -.5755805   .2501565    -2.30   0.021    -1.066035   -.0851261
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Test of excluded instruments: 
F (58, 5048) =8.15 
Prob > F =0.0000 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0003789   .0097131    -0.04   0.969    -.0194223    .0186645
  lagecrime7     .0222799   .0066538     3.35   0.001     .0092344    .0353253
  lagecrime6     .0224127   .0066541     3.37   0.001     .0093667    .0354586
  lagecrime5     .0222799   .0066538     3.35   0.001     .0092344    .0353253
  lagecrime3     .0103668   .0043899     2.36   0.018     .0017601    .0189736
  lagecrime2      .010536   .0044002     2.39   0.017      .001909    .0191629
  lagecrime1     .0103668   .0043899     2.36   0.018     .0017601    .0189736
     ecrime7     .0050592    .005165     0.98   0.327    -.0050672    .0151855
     ecrime6     .0049524   .0051705     0.96   0.338    -.0051849    .0150897
     ecrime5     .0050592    .005165     0.98   0.327    -.0050672    .0151855
     ecrime3     8.87e-06   .0041822     0.00   0.998    -.0081907    .0082085
     ecrime2     .0001974    .004189     0.05   0.962    -.0080155    .0084103
     ecrime1     8.87e-06   .0041822     0.00   0.998    -.0081907    .0082085
   citysize3    -.0014761   .0036945    -0.40   0.690    -.0087195    .0057673
   citysize2     .0027132   .0029814     0.91   0.363    -.0031321    .0085585
   citysize1    -.0029565   .0045145    -0.65   0.513    -.0118076    .0058946
     region9    -.0068115   .0069039    -0.99   0.324    -.0203473    .0067243
     region8    -.0059665   .0058569    -1.02   0.308    -.0174495    .0055165
     region7    -.0040919   .0064505    -0.63   0.526    -.0167387    .0085548
     region6     .0030355    .005842     0.52   0.603    -.0084182    .0144892
     region5    -.0065287   .0055695    -1.17   0.241    -.0174483    .0043908
     region4    -.0081348   .0063993    -1.27   0.204    -.0206812    .0044116
     region3     -.008059   .0058317    -1.38   0.167    -.0194926    .0033747
     region2    -.0080158   .0063105    -1.27   0.204    -.0203881    .0043566
      year25     .0267179    .011728     2.28   0.023     .0037242    .0497117
      year24     .0161472   .0100924     1.60   0.110    -.0036398    .0359342
      year23    -.0174952   .0070404    -2.48   0.013    -.0312985    -.003692
      year22    -.0067061   .0065439    -1.02   0.306    -.0195361    .0061238
      year21    -.0059035   .0063903    -0.92   0.356    -.0184323    .0066254
      year20     -.014465    .006304    -2.29   0.022    -.0268246   -.0021055
      year19    -.0207993   .0070205    -2.96   0.003    -.0345636    -.007035
      year18    -.0089576   .0075158    -1.19   0.233    -.0236929    .0057777
      year17    -.0255013   .0072145    -3.53   0.000    -.0396459   -.0113567
      year16     .0109155   .0056664     1.93   0.054    -.0001941    .0220251
      year15     .0062013   .0081986     0.76   0.449    -.0098728    .0222754
      year14     .0007234   .0067707     0.11   0.915    -.0125511    .0139979
      year13     .0087353   .0062421     1.40   0.162     -.003503    .0209736
      year12     .0342255   .0112083     3.05   0.002     .0122506    .0562004
      year11     -.003154   .0115141    -0.27   0.784    -.0257286    .0194205
      year10     .0195843   .0076724     2.55   0.011     .0045418    .0346268
       year9    -.0082761   .0057567    -1.44   0.151    -.0195626    .0030105
       year8    -.0177478   .0069152    -2.57   0.010    -.0313057   -.0041898
       year7      .013757   .0087851     1.57   0.117    -.0034671    .0309811
       year6     .0176454   .0078942     2.24   0.025     .0021682    .0331226
       year4    -.0048754   .0068919    -0.71   0.479    -.0183876    .0086368
       year3    -.0025414   .0075292    -0.34   0.736    -.0173031    .0122203
      crime3     .0001715   .0050368     0.03   0.973    -.0097035    .0100465
      crime1     .0001715   .0050368     0.03   0.973    -.0097035    .0100465
     dlneduc    -.0276891   .0258149    -1.07   0.284    -.0783016    .0229234
   dlnpubwel     .0269396   .0088289     3.05   0.002     .0096297    .0442495
    dfemaleh    -.7820237   1.214973    -0.64   0.520    -3.164087    1.600039
      dblack      .186721   .4195262     0.45   0.656    -.6357977     1.00924
      dyoung     .5318251   .9673314     0.55   0.582    -1.364715    2.428365
       dunem    -.3522695   .2615713    -1.35   0.178    -.8651035    .1605645
                                                                              
lagdlnoffi~r        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
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Appendix C 
2SLS Estimates of Crimes (Partial) 
2SLS Estimates of Violent Crime with Respect to Police Using Data of Year 1985-1992 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Δln violent Δln violent Δln violent 
ln sworn officer 0.601 0.583 0.376 
 (0.725) (0.342) (0.246) 
    
Lag ln sworn officer -1.151 0.00196 0.240 
 (0.756) (0.275) (0.254) 
    
Sum of ln sworn officer -0.550 0.584 0.616 
 (0.903) (0.480) (0.398) 
    
State unemployment rate -1.006 -1.354 -1.596 
 (1.412) (1.172) (1.161) 
    
Percent ages 18-24 -8.836 -12.04 -12.37 
 (8.964) (8.398) (8.364) 
    
Percent black 1.224 2.571 2.570 
 (2.873) (2.377) (2.340) 
    
Percent female-headed household -1.558 -2.853 -2.997 
 (7.561) (7.044) (7.053) 
    
ln public welfare spending per capita  -0.00148 -0.0429 -0.0494 
 (0.0508) (0.0447) (0.0462) 
    
ln education spending per capita -0.0521 -0.0960 -0.113 
 (0.0999) (0.0896) (0.0894) 
N 1294 1294 1294 
R
2
 . 0.106 0.102 
Note: Dependent variable is Δln crime rate per capita for one of the three crime categories (burglary, 
larceny, motor vehicle theft). Right-hand-variables are all first differenced. Estimates are obtained 
estimating all property crime categories jointly, allowing for a city-fixed effect across crime rates and 
heteroskedasticity across crime categories. Crime specific year dummies, region dummies and city-size 
indicators are included in all regressions. Column (1) instruments using mayoral and gubernatorial election-
year indicators. Column (2) instruments using interactions between the city-size indicators and election 
years. Column (3) instruments using interactions between the region dummies and election years. S.D. in 
parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
All data are from the 1985-1992 period. 
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2SLS Estimates of Property Crime with Respect to Police Using Data of Year 1985-1992 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Δln property Δln property Δln property 





 (0.614) (0.271) (0.192) 
    
Lag ln sworn officer -1.296
*
 -0.366 0.335 
 (0.614) (0.261) (0.189) 
    
Sum of ln sworn officer -0.728 0.335 0.751 
 （0.743） （0.401） （0.304） 
    
State unemployment rate 0.352 0.191 -0.256 
 (1.285) (0.903) (0.863) 
    
Percent ages 18-24 -4.548 -7.394 -8.885 
 (6.948) (5.714) (5.515) 
    
Percent black 0.0464 1.366 1.827 
 (2.522) (1.853) (1.706) 
    
Percent female-headed household 3.171 2.158 1.625 
 (6.919) (6.005) (5.932) 
    
ln public welfare spending per capita 0.0538 0.0177 -0.00595 
 (0.0416) (0.0334) (0.0338) 
    
ln education spending per capita 0.0418 0.00858 -0.0309 
 (0.0782) (0.0658) (0.0674) 
N 975 975 975 
R
2
 . 0.104 0.142 
Note: Dependent variable is Δln crime rate per capita for one of the three crime categories (burglary, 
larceny, motor vehicle theft). Right-hand-variables are all first differenced. Estimates are obtained 
estimating all property crime categories jointly, allowing for a city-fixed effect across crime rates and 
heteroskedasticity across crime categories. Crime specific year dummies, region dummies and city-size 
indicators are included in all regressions. Column (1) instruments using mayoral and gubernatorial election-
year indicators. Column (2) instruments using interactions between the city-size indicators and election 
years. Column (3) instruments using interactions between the region dummies and election years. S.D. in 
parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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